James R. McPhie v. John W. Turner : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1960
James R. McPhie v. John W. Turner : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Walter L. Budge; Vernon B. Romney; Attorneys for Respondent;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, McPhie v. Turner, No. 9163 (Utah Supreme Court, 1960).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3537
In the Supreme Court 
ol the State ol Utah 
JAMES R. McPHIE, F ~ L E D 
Plaintiff and Appellant,- - "<..1 1 9 1960 
-vs-
JOHN W. TURNER, Warden of 
Utah State Prison, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
WALTER L. BUDGE 
Attorney General 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
PRINTERS INC., SUGAR HOUSE 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX 
Page 
STATEMENT OF FACTS____________________________________________ 1 
STATEMENT OF POINTS _______________________________________ 2 
ARGUMENT ----------------------------------------------------------------- 2 
POINT I. APPELLANT'S STAY OF EXECUTION OF 
SENTENCE EXPIRED AND, SINCE HE HAD 
NOT BEEN PLACED ON PROBATION INDEF-
INITELY DURING GOOD BEHAVIOR, THE 
COURT THEREUPON PROPERLY ORDERED 
HIM TO SERVE THE PRISON SENTENCE __________ 2 
CON CL US I 0 N ------------------------------------------------------------------- 6 
CASES CITED 
Demmick v. Harris, 107 Utah 471, 155 P.2d 170 _______________ 3 
State v. Zolantakis, 70 Utah 296, 259 P. 1044 ___________________ 3 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the Supreme Court 
ol the State ol Utah 
JAMES R. McPHIE, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs-
JOHN W. TURNER, Warden of 
Utah State Prison, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 9163 
Respondent does not dispute appellant's statement of 
facts. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
APPELLANT'S STAY OF EXECUTION OF SEN-
TENCE EXPIRED AND, SINCE HE HAD NOT 
BEEN PLACED ON PROBATION INDEFINITE-
LY DURING GOOD BEHAVIOR, THE COURT 
THEREUPON PROPERLY ORDERED HIM TO 
SERVE THE PRISON SENTENCE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
APPELLANT'S STAY OF EXECUTION OF SEN-
TENCE EXPIRED AND, SINCE HE HAD NOT 
BEEN PLACED ON PROBATION INDEFINITE-
LY DURING GOOD BEHAVIOR, THE COURT 
THEREUPON PROPERLY ORDERED HIM TO 
SERVE THE PRISON SENTENCE. 
The court, in the interest of justice and in the proper 
exercise of its discretion, granted appellant McPhie a stay 
of execution of sentence and placed him under the super-
vision of the Adult Probation and Parole Department. 
McPhie was not placed "on probation" at all even though 
ordered under the Department's supervision during the 
pendency of his stay. The stay date was extended from 
time to time until January 9, 1959. It expired and McPhie 
was ordered to serve the proper sentence for the crime 
committed. 
Counsel for McPhie makes a great point of his having 
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been placed on probation. He was not placed on probation. 
The court's order said nothing about probation at all. All 
it did was place him under the supervision of the Depart-
ment. 
Assuming, however, for the sake of argument, that 
he was placed on some sort of probation, he certainly can-
not, by any stretch of the imagination, be construed to 
have been placed on probation indefinitely during good 
behavior. 
The rule in the State of Utah in regard to a person 
situated as appellant McPhie was, is given in the case of 
Demmick v. Harris, 107 Utah 471, 155 P.2d 170. It is this: 
when one convicted of a crime and sentenced has been 
given a stay of execution to a date certain, and the date 
has expired, he is not entitled to a hearing before being 
committed to Prison. 
The court clearly distinguished the Demmick case 
from that of State v. Zolantakis, 70 Utah 296, 259 P. 1044, 
and certain other cases. The pertinent words of Justice 
McDonough follow: 
"The Zolantakis case was decided on appeal from 
the order revoking the suspension of sentence. 
Therein we stated [70 Utah 296, 259 P. 1046]: 
~In the absence of -statutory authority, in this 
jurisdiction, district courts do not have inherent 
power to suspend sentences except for some def-
inite period and for some specific temporary pur-
pose * * *. Under the statute * * * trial courts are 
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not given authority to suspend sentences as a mat-
ter of favor or grace, but only when "it appears 
compatible with the public interest.' 
We also said: 
'The purpose of the law permitting suspension 
of sentence is clearly reformatory. If those who are 
to be reformed cannot implicitly rely upon prom-
ises or orders contained in the suspension of sen-
tences, then we n1ay well expect the law to fail in 
its purpose. Reformation can certainly best be ac-
complished by fair, consistent, and straightforward 
treatment of the person sought to be reformed. It 
would therefore seem, both upon authority and 
principle, that when a sentence is suspended dur-
ing good behavior, without reservations, the person 
whose sentence is thus suspended has a vested 
right to :rely thereon so long as such condition is 
complied with. * * * Such right may not be alter-
nately granted and denied without just cause.' 
But here we are met by respondent's -contention 
that the use of the writ of habeas corpus is restrict-
ed to the correction of jurisdictional errors and 
errors so gross as in effect to deprive one of con-
stitutional substantive or procedural rights. Thomp-
son v. Harris, 107 Utah 99, 152 P.2d 91, opinion on 
petition for rehearing. We shall assun1e for the 
purposes of this case that it would constitute such 
deprivation of appellant's rights, if Judge Ellett on 
November 28, the date of sentence, placed appel-
lant on probation during good behavior; and, there-
after revoked such order without notice and 
hearing. 
Furthermore, we shall assume-and the proposi-
tion must be conceded- that the mere summary 
summoning of one on probation to the chambers 
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5 
of the sentencing judge to be there cross-examined 
concerning his conduct either before or after the 
order granting probation, would fall short of ac-
cording him the hearing the law prescribes. The 
prln1ary question, therefore, is: Was appellant, on 
the date of sentence, granted an indefinite stay of 
execution and placed on probation during good 
behavior. 
The question must be answered in the negative. 
The order, itself, specifically makes the stay one 
until a definite time. * * *" 
The court further stated at page 477 as follows: 
"Whether one convicted of crime, and subject to 
punishment therefor, should be placed on proba-
tion is a matter in such court's discretion. It would 
be but salutary procedure in the exercise of such 
discretion for a trial judge who is doubtful whether 
the granting of probation during good behavior is 
compatible with the public interest, to make such 
investigation as his judgment dictates as to the 
attitudes of the person convicted. Nor do we see 
anything irregular in the court's action in this 
case in requiring compliance with conditions us-
. ually imposed on those placed on probation during 
good behavior, as a condition to the keeping in 
force of the stay order until the date of its expira-
tion. The appellant, it appears from the record, 
could not have been misled thereby. Indeed the 
record below reveals that what in truth shocked 
appellant's sense of justice was that he was unable 
to tell a story which the sentencing judge would 
believe. However, the burden of persuasion was 
upon hilm; and the one to be persuaded was the 
judge in whose power it lay to grant an additional 
stay of execution; not the court sitting below in 
this proceeding, nor this court on appeal." 
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In the Demmick case, Chief Justice Larson concurred 
specially, and in doing so made the following statement 
which we believe properly covers the case at hand: 
"The record is definite that sentence was imposed 
upon Demmick on November 28, 1942, and a stay 
of execution was granted until January 4, 1943. 
Such stay of execution operated only to delay com-
mitment until the day certain fixed in the stay. At 
the expiration of that time, commitment issues as 
of course, unless the court by order grants a fur-
ther stay. * * *" 
The fact that appellant's stay date was continued from 
time to time to new dates certain is not sufficient to re-
move it from the confines of the Demmick decision. 
Appellant's appeal, therefore, has no foundation and 
must be dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
'The appeal of appellant James R. McPhie does not 
set forth grounds entitling him to a reversal of the finding 
of the court below and should therefore be dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WALTER L. BUDGE 
Attorney General 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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